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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from certified orders dismissing (on motion to dismiss)
counterclaims of Appellants in Case No. 140900915 in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for of Salt Lake County, State of Utah; the Honorable Andrew H. Stone.
Jurisdiction is pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-102 (3)(e)(v).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
BY
FAILING
TO
INDEPENDENTLY
ANALYZE
STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, CONTRARY TO JENSEN V. CUNNINGHAM,
2011 UT 17; DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DISMISSING BASED ONLY
UPON PRECLUSION STATE LAW COUNTERCLAIMS BECAUSE A
FEDERALCOURT HAD PREVIOUSLY FOUND UNDISPUTED FACTS DID NOT
GIVE RISE TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION?
a.

i.

Most apposite law: Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17.

ii.

Standards of review:

“Interpretation of the Utah Constitution and the application of collateral estoppel
are both questions of law that we review for correctness.” Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011
UT 17, ¶ 37, 250 P.3d 465, 476. “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, ‘we view the
facts and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all
reasonable inferences in his favor.’” Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp. Ltd., 2014
UT 13, ¶ 2 n.1.
iii.

Citation to record showing preservation:

Haik filed Answer and Counterclaims. (R2724-2783) City moved dismissal
(R3008-3043) Haik opposed dismissal. (R3461-3492) The City replied. (R3880-3897)
The District Court dismissal read on the record. (R4159) Written order was
subsequently entered. (R4299-4304) Haik filed for entry of judgment and certification.
(R4160-4171) The City opposed. (R4187-4191) Haik replied. (R4195-4197) The
Court entered order granting the motion for entry of judgment and certification. (R4397;
ADD3-ADD11) Haik filed notice of appeal. (ADD1-ADD2)
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STATEMENT OF CASE
The City sought judicial review after the State Engineer approved two of six
change applications title to which was adjudicated in Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26.
(R1-63) The City requested the District Court quiet title and declare against the water
rights underlying the six applications adjudicated in Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26;
contending that decision does not affect the validity of the conveyance to Sandy City.
(R2011, ¶69). The City also requested declaration against the State Engineer regarding
his approvals. (R8-11)
Haik and Butler answered (R741-776 and R1296-1330) and moved dismissal.
(R1387-1408) Dismissal was granted dismissal with leave to amend. (R1969-1974)
Amended petition was filed. (R1997-2023) Haik and Butler moved dismissal (R21912195) which was denied. (R2689 and R2963-2966) Haik and Butler answered and
counterclaimed.

(R2724-2783)

The counterclaims ask the court declare the City’s

authority and responsibility to furnish water, and the validity of the City’s water rights
upon which alleged were injured. The counterclaims contend the City’s duties and rights
derive from Utah Constitution Article XI, § 6, as well as other constitutional duties or
restraints imposed by Article I, § 7, or Article I, § 24; when wielded unreasonably and
discriminatorily or in a procedurally deficient manner. (R2756-81)
The City moved dismissal. (R3008-3043) Haik and Butler opposed. (R34613492) The City replied. (R3880-3897) The Court denied dismissal ruling on the record.
2
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(R4159) Haik and Butler moved for entry of judgment and certification. (R4160-4171)
The City opposed. (R4187-4191) Haik and Butler replied. (R4195-4197) The Court
granted certification (R4397) and filed order granting dismissal and certification.
(ADD3-ADD11; R4429-4432) Appeal followed. (ADD1-ADD2; R4435-4436)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By alleging injury to all its water rights, the City presents new material operative
facts never previously or finally adjudicated. (R1997-2023) By alleging injury to all its
water rights within Little Cottonwood Canyon, the City changed the circumstances
thereby barring preclusion. (R2001, ¶19; R2002, ¶24; R2003, ¶29; R2004-2006, ¶¶31-38)
The alleged cause of the City’s injury is the State Engineer’s approved use and the
proposed use of water drawn from the Murray penstock through a 6 inch pipe based upon
rights adjudicated in Haik v. Sandy City. The City does not allege any particular quantity
of use causing injury, disclosing: “The 6 inch meter on the 6 inch pipe was sized for the
summer flow of 0.25 cfs and does not record the low flows of 0.0116 cfs during the
winter months.” (R2472-2473) And, “Also, the meter is buried under snow much of the
winter months and cannot be read.” (R2473) The alleged injury is not particular as the
City says: “So we are about death by a thousand cuts, both with respect to quantity and
respect to quality.” (R5323, ll. 21-22)
Little Cottonwood creek runs westerly down Little Cottonwood Canyon through
the mountains southeast from the City. See Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City,
3
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123 Utah 242 (1953). The creek veers north upon emerging from the Canyon across the
Wasatch fault line and enters Salt Lake Valley. Id. The Canyon provides access to
several of Utah's largest ski resorts. See Winkler v. Utah, 2014 UT App 141.
The State Engineer oversees distribution of water through the Little Cottonwood
Creek Distribution system; previously the Court oversaw that distribution. (R2427)
Water is diverted from the Murray penstock at point “4. 6” pipeline to So. Despain
Ditch”. (ADD18) Branch lines from the 6” line carry the water to users. (ADD20 and
ADD21) The State Engineer issued the Little Cottonwood Creek Flow Diagram showing
this diversion. (ADD19) The distribution committee includes the City as part of the
municipal group (R2430-34) and its Director of Public Utilities is City representative.
(R2435)
The “Salt Lake City Service Area” encompasses the Little Cottonwood Creek
Distribution System including Albion Basin Subdivision in the Town of Alta. (R276061, ¶¶21-29; ADD29) The State Engineer approved the City’s appropriation to supply
homes in Albion Basin Subdivision, application a16846. (ADD35-ADD37) The State
Engineer also approved the City’s application to supply the Little Cottonwood Canyon
ski resorts. (ADD40 and ADD41; R1533-74; R1575-1653)
When seeking approval to supply Albion Basin Subdivision, the City explicitly
intended to deny the appropriated water: “Salt Lake City promised Mayor Levitt that it
would gain control of the Albion Basin contracts in order to protect the area from
4
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development by using Salt Lake City’s watershed management muscle to deny them
water.” (R2770-71, ¶85; ADD38-ADD39) The City planned to deny the appropriated
water: “Once the City has the contracts we will not certify for water service for new
building permits.” (R2770, ¶83; ADD30-ADD34)
The City acted on its intent by sending a letter1 to Salt Lake Valley Health
Department and the Town of Alta. (R2737-2738, ¶¶69-76; R2765, ¶56; R1214) On one
hand the City asserts “amount of water allowed under the contract cannot exceed 50
gallons per day per connection” (R1214); and on the other asserts: “The only thing that
has changed since 1997 is that the 1963 Agreement has been abandoned.” (R2765, ¶53)
The City admits approved “application a16846 allows the City to use more than the
amount of water described in the 1963 Agreement in Albion Basin” and the City asserts it

1

Salt Lake Valley Board of Health adopted Health Regulation #14 as of
December 3, 1981 and amendments as of July 12, 1984; November 1, 1990; December 3,
1992; May 5, 1994; and, December 7, 2006. Section 4.1.1 of Health Regulation #14
states the Director of the Salt Lake Valley Health Department and the Director of Public
Utilities have joint enforcement. Section 2.4 of Health Regulation #14 states “Director of
Public Utilities” shall mean the Director of the Salt Lake City Department of Public
Utilities, or his or her designee. Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.1.4 of Health Regulation #14
provides “Salt Lake City Watershed Area” shall mean watershed area within Little
Cottonwood Canyon. Section 4.5.3 of Health Regulation #14 provides “Applicants for
building permits within the Salt Lake City Watershed Area shall also submit to the
Department a letter from the Director of Public Utilities stating that the applicant has
received water available through a water sales agreement with Salt Lake City for the
project.”
5
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is supplying water to the homes in the same subdivision pursuant to that water right.
(R2765, ¶54; R2764, ¶50; R1184-1198)
The City’s letter prompted the Salt Lake Valley Board of Health to deny approval.
(R2005, ¶35; R2726, ¶14) As a result of the City’s letter, Salt Lake Valley Health
Department asserts “…failure to attach the required documentation of a letter from the
City indicating his access to water, the sole basis for the summary judgment decision of
the Health Department’s hearing Officer” led to denial of approval of sewerage for
homes in the Albion Basin Subdivision. (Appellate Case 14-4074 Doc. 01019325972 pp.
36-37)”. (R2766, ¶64)
The City now alleges lawful use of private water (ADD22-ADD25) the City
contracted to deliver (ADD13-ADD17) injures public water the City appropriated
(ADD35-ADD37) while intending and planning to deny the stated beneficial use to the
same homes. (ADD30-ADD34; ADD38-ADD39). The City alleges “As a matter of law,
any use of LCC water by the Defendants … under their respective claimed water rights
… would impair and interfere with essentially all LCC water rights, including SLC LCC
water rights, to the damage of the Plaintiffs.” (R2001, ¶¶18-19) Haik filed change
application “seeking State Engineer approval to move the point of diversion and place of
use for their claimed water rights to the Albion Basin” for the “purpose of use to the
domestic use of one residence”. (R2014, ¶¶95-96) Haik’s application for use of private

6
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water has been pending for more than a decade. (Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26;
R2014, ¶100)
This Court ruled “the Haik Parties were the first to record their deed to the
disputed water right in good faith”. Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26. Pursuant to Utah's
Recording Act and Utah's Water and Irrigation Act, Sandy City’s deed is void. Utah
Code §§ 57-3-103 and 73-3-12. Yet, the City alleges:
68.
The Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney, Inc. sold any water
rights they had relating to lands under the South Despain Ditch to Sandy
City in 1977. Any adjudication in which it was concluded otherwise is not
binding upon Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs were not parties to that proceeding.
(R2011, ¶68)
69.
The Haik v. Sandy City decision does not affect the validity
of the conveyance from the Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy
City. (R2011, ¶69)
70.
One requirement for water rights to pass as an appurtenance
is unity of title. Ownership of the water rights in question and the land in
question must be the same. After the conveyance to Sandy City, no
conveyance of land by Saunders and Sweeney or the Bentleys could carry
by appurtenance any part of the South Despain first primary award.
(R2011, ¶70)
The City premises injury upon a void deed even though “A contract or a deed that is void
cannot be ratified or accepted”. Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37
The District Court dismissed without independently analyzing State Constitutional
protections put at issue by the City thereby clearly erring. The City premises its alleged
injury upon the validity of the City’s water rights derived from Article XI, § 6, and
subject to it. Utah Constitution Article XI, § 6 provides:
7
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No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or
dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or sources of water supply now, or
hereafter to be owned or controlled by it; but all such waterworks, water
rights and sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired
by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated
by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any
such municipal corporation from exchanging water-rights, or sources of
water supply, for other water-rights or sources of water supply of equal
value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public supply of its
inhabitants.
The City’s injury ignores restraints imposed by Article I, § 7 and Article I, § 24. Utah
Constitution Article I, §7, provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.” Utah Constitution Article I, § 24, provides: “All
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” The District Court did not abide
by Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465 (Utah 2011) by failing to analyze these State
constitutional guarantees.
District Courts are charged to declare what the rights at issue are; and equally
important, what those rights are not; in view of the vital importance of water. The
counterclaims ask the Court declare five aspects of defining mutual rights and obligations
given their substantial public importance.
First, beginning with Article XI, § 6, (R2756-2781). As interpreted and applied by
the City, the words “all such waterworks, water rights and sources of water supply now
owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved,
maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable” are
8
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causing uncertainty and insecurity and controversy. In state constitutional law analysis
Article XI, § 6, calls out for different analysis than under the federal constitution. There
is no similitude in fundamental principles nor overlap in concepts between the state and
federal constitutions. The unique language of Article XI, § 6, its distinct context within
State constitutional debate, and differing jurisprudential considerations lead to different
results in applying principles under Article I, § 7 and § 24 than under federal
constitutional law.
Objectively analyzed as to its original plain meaning in historical perspective; the
text and structure of Article XI, § 6, develops the legal framework for delineating the
defining mutual rights and obligations: “It was meant to secure to communities their
water systems and prohibit any sale or lease to private parties. This is one project which
the Constitution decreed should be kept in social ownership by the community.” Genola
Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88. It “evinces a state policy of displacing competition
with regulation in the area of municipal control over water and water rights.” Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33.
Record of constitutional debates extrinsically evidence the framers’ intent
municipal rights be construed “as a trust for the benefit of the inhabitants to supply them
with water, the courts will always construe the question of a reasonable charge, because it
will be a trust fixed and form by the Constitution for the purpose of supplying the people
with water, and they will have no right to charge more than a reasonable amount”. 1
9
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Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention for the State of Utah 672
(1898).
Second, Article I, § 24, the focus of the second counterclaim (R2779); expresses
settled concern for restraining municipal officials from fundamentally unfair practice of
classifying persons so as to treat similarly situated persons differently to the detriment of
some of those so classified. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637
(Utah 1989). A fundamentally unfair practice of detrimentally classifying some homes as
water worthy while denying water to other homes in the same approved subdivision is at
issue. (See, R2764-65, ¶¶49-71; R1098-1126; R1127-1149; R1219-1247; R1184-1198)
The mapping of lots receiving and not receiving water shows stark disparity. (ADD42)
This disparity implicates an unconstitutional singling out.
Justification for singling out some homes is tenuous as municipal officials
promising one another to use “muscle” to deny water held in trust violates “the
requirement of reasonableness, which attends all actions by municipalities” and does “not
cease at the city limits.” Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 P.2d 325, 330 (Utah 1997).
Promising to use “muscle” to deny appropriated water cannot be imputed to any
legitimate purpose. The City’s inconsistent positions regarding the abandoned contract
noted above evidence unreasonableness. (R2765-2766, ¶¶53-62)
Third, Article I, § 7, the subject of the third counterclaim (R2780, ¶127); seeks to
understand the purview of procedures of due process protections referenced in Rupp v.
10
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Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980). Utah Code § 10-8-15 does not confer
authority upon Salt Lake City to “control development”; that power is conferred by Utah
Code § 10-9a-102(2) and does not extend to the controlling development in Albion Basin
within the Town of Alta. Singling out has led to denial of building permit. (R2766-77,
¶¶63-65) The memoranda of the City’s Director of Public Utilities are not passed or
enacted by the governing body of the City; are not in the mandated form of an ordinance,
Utah Code § 10-3-704 and §10-3-705; and do not include disclosure of publication or
posting, Utah Code § 10-3-711. (R2773, ¶96) The City can only “exercise its legislative
powers through ordinances.” (R2773, ¶95)

Failure to strictly follow the statutory

requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid.” Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d
180, 183 (Utah 1986). (R2773, ¶97)
Appropriating with actual intent to deny the state beneficial use violates longstanding precedence: “He may not file his application, construct his works, and then hold
the water and wait for something to happen. He cannot withhold the water from the
proposed beneficial use.” Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 225 (1910). Such intent
defies elements essential to lawfully appropriating. Id.
Fourth, prospect of differing standards between constitutional law and Utah
appropriative law is the subject of the fourth counterclaim; given expressed intent to deny
and denial of appropriated water to approved beneficial use can the City allege injury?
(R2781, ¶¶129-30) By law, if the City unlawfully appropriated declaring that invalidity
11
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returns wrongfully appropriated waters to the public or prior appropriators entitled to its
use. Utah Code § 73-1-4. Given “[a]n appropriative water right depends on beneficial
use for its continued validity,” In re Bear River, 819 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah 1991), there is
real question whether the City can appropriate to supply homes then deny that supply to
sue asserting that appropriative right. (R.2778, ¶¶116-19)
A remedy for declaratory relief should exist because (given citizens’ ready
willingness to bear the burdens of extension), the City’s duty is “a ministerial act about
which it would have no discretion” as opined in Rose v. Plymouth Town, 110 Utah 358
(1946). If the City can sue over one cut in one thousand, then citizens sued are entitled to
declaration of the validity of the City’s water rights about which it sued and its duties to
serve within its establish service area.
Fifth, the subject matter of the fifth counterclaim (R2781, ¶132); is the question
whether the “state policy of displacing competition with regulation in the area of
municipal control over water and water rights” articulated in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big
Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, 258 P.3d 539, has now led to the City rendering a
utility service outside its city limits to such an extent as to be “subject to some public
regulation” particularly given the disparity in treatment of inhabitants of the approved
municipal service area outside the corporate boundaries of the City. Salt Lake County v.
Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1977). (R2775, ¶108)

12
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The City asserts it is the largest retail water provider in Utah and holds the vast
majority of water rights in Little Cottonwood Creek, providing nearly all the in-canyon
usage of water. (R2774-75, ¶¶103-07) The City asserts, between itself and Sandy City,
they collectively own the rights to use 99.65% of the first 94.79 cfs of LCC (the “first and
second primary” rights), 99.55% of the flow rights up to 111.86 cfs (the combined “first
and second primary” and “first surplus” rights), approximately 88% of the flow rights up
to 159.09 cfs (the combined “first and second primary” and “first surplus” and “second
surplus” rights), and approximately 78% of the flow rights up to 398.36 cfs (the
combined rights including “third surplus” rights).” (R2774, ¶103) “On a volume basis
based on average annual hydrology, Plaintiffs and Sandy City collectively own the rights
to use more than 95% of the first and second primary rights, and more than 92% of the
overall LCC annual volume.” (R2774, ¶103)
When the City’s exemption was recognized, this Court acknowledged “the fears
expressed by plaintiffs that cities will engage in the utility business on a broad scale in
competition with and destructive of regularly authorized privately owned utilities does
not seem to be justified”. County Water Sys. v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 52 (Utah
1954). The state policy against alienation founded in Article XI, § 6, means wrongfully
appropriated water should not be displacing competition within in the area of municipal
control over water and water rights; in this instance, the watershed of Little Cottonwood
Creek. The City mapped the entirety of that watershed as part of its service area.
13
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(R2760-61, ¶¶21-29; ADD29)

The City asserts it holds and exercised extra-territorial

jurisdiction pursuant to Article XI, § 6, and Utah Code §10-8-15 (R2762, ¶32) and
defined it by ordinance as the Salt Lake City Watershed Area. (R2769, ¶78) The stated
beneficial use for which the City appropriated but denies to inhabitants (thereby
displacing that water from private markets) is a matter of substantial public importance.
The District Court did not question there was a genuine justiciable controversy.
The fact the City sued shows the interests of the parties involved are adverse. Having
been sued, and owning private water already adjudicated, the use of which is alleged to
injury public water rights; Haik has or asserts bona fide claims of a legally protectable
interest to know the force and the effect of Utah Constitutional provisions and related
questions. Given the City sued asserting lawful private water use is injuring alleged
public water rights; the mutual rights and obligations associated with them are ripe for
judicial determination.

Either there is actual controversy, or there is a substantial

likelihood that one will develop, such that there is a useful purpose served in resolving
the issues or avoiding future controversy or further litigation.
What is then left, and the sole reason given, is preclusion. The applied preclusion
defies the recent, compelling precedence that a Utah District Court errs in applying
preclusion “because the legal standard for state and federal constitutional violations is not
identical”. Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465, 489 (Utah 2011). The foundational
point of Jensen is that the District Court must actually analyze the differing constitutional
14
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principles. The absence of analysis of the independent protections afforded by the Utah
Constitution necessitates reversal and remand.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
City Sues Alleging Injury to All Water Rights
In December 2014, Salt Lake City (“City”) sued Mark C. Haik (“Haik”). (R19972023) The City alleges “The water rights claims of Defendants currently and materially
injure Plaintiffs by placing a cloud of record on SLC’s title to LCC water rights.”
(R2002, ¶24)
This Court previously held Haik recorded his deed first and in good faith and
therefore affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to Haik’s
water right. Haik v. Sandy City, 254 P.3d 171, 180 (Utah 2011). Haik purchased
through Biddulph who “filed an application with the Utah State Engineer for a permanent
change of water, which was approved”. Id. at 174. (ADD22-ADD25; ADD27-ADD28)
The City alleges this approval and that the “approved change application gave State
Engineer approval to return to the stream as a source”. (R2013, ¶¶88 and 89)
The State Engineer approved Biddulph’s application August 4, 2000. (ADD22ADD25) Contrary to the plain meaning of State Engineer’s approval to using the stream
source; the City alleges: “At the time of the purported conveyance, WRN 57-7800 was a
certificated well right, Certificate a702”.

(R2013, ¶87; R2102)

At the time of

conveyance, WRN 57-7800 was an approved stream source not the well. (ADD2215
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ADD25) The State Engineer had explicitly addressed certificate a702: “By this
application, Applicant is merely correcting the State Engineer records to show that
Applicant is still taking water from the Salt Lake City line and is, in fact, abandoning the
well constructed under Change Application No. a4178.”(ADD22) Even so, the City
alleges: “As a matter of law, from May 24, 1971 to August 8, 2000, no one claiming an
interest in WRN 57-7800 had any right to divert any LCC water under WRN 57-7800, as
that right had been converted to a well water right by Certificate a702.” (R2013, ¶91)
In June 2003 Biddulph requested from the City all flow measurements as to her
right. (R2472) The City replied in July 2003 writing: “I understand that you need the
following information for filing your proof due for water right 57-7800 (a24463) with the
Utah State Engineer.” (R2473) The City now alleges there has been no use since 2000.
(R2002, ¶21) Biddulph applied on August 15, 20013 to the State Engineer to extend her
time to construct two additional residences and fully place the water to beneficial use.
(R2492) The State Engineer approved Biddulph’s extension. (R2493-2494) After the
State Engineer’s approval, the Haik Parties recorded their deed on December 10, 2003.
Haik v. Sandy City, 254 P.3d 171, 174 (Utah 2011).

No one appealed the State

Engineer’s approval. (R2727, ¶18)
Now the City alleges “The Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney, Inc. sold any
water rights they had relating to lands under the South Despain Ditch to Sandy City in
1977.” (R2011, ¶68) The City then continues: “After the conveyance to Sandy City, no
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conveyance of land by Saunders and Sweeney or the Bentleys could carry by
appurtenance any part of the South Despain first primary award.” (R.2011, ¶70) Despite
the State Engineer’s approvals, the City alleges “As a matter of law, any use of LCC
water by the Defendants under their respective claimed water rights has a priority date of
2000 at the earliest” and “Given that 2000 priority, any use of LCC water would impair
and interfere with essentially all LCC water rights, including SLC LCC water rights, to
the damage of the Plaintiffs.” (R2001, ¶¶18 and 19) The Amended Petition “does not
expressly allege a reasonable probability of future injury”: The words “reasonable
probability are never used. (R1997-2023)
Dismissal Sought Due to Lack of Jurisdiction and Stare Decisis
Haik moved to dismiss for because of failure to allege any distinct and palpable
injury of demonstrable or measurable harm as mandated by Washington County Water
Conservancy District v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125; and no reasonable
probability of future injury mandated by Brown v. Division of Water Rights of the Dep't
of Natural Resources of Utah, 2010 UT 14, 228 P.3d 747. (R2191-2195) Haik also
answered asserting stare decisis barred overturning of Haik v. Sandy City, as that ruling
was not erroneous, remains sound, and more harm will come by departing from that
precedent. (R2755, ¶177) Haik further asserted claim or issue preclusion barred the
City’s claims. (R2755, ¶176)
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Haik contended the City’s direct challenge to voiding of Sandy City’s deed
rendered stare decisis applicable. (R3513-3514) Haik contends that voided deed can
only be treated set forth in Haik v. Sandy City, particularly as the City alleged no
conveyance to it nor alleged any particular water right title that was clouded. (R3514)
As to res judicata, Haik contends the City exercised “some control over the litigation” in
Haik v. Sandy City, as set forth in Baxter v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1169
(Utah 1985). (R3506)
Haik contended Statements of Accounts submitted by the City’s attorneys
evidence the City exercised control sufficient for privity with Sandy City thereby
rendering Haik v. Sandy City binding upon Salt Lake City.

(R3507-3513) Haik

contended the Statements of Account (R3509) detailed Salt Lake City’s attorney, Shawn
Draney, repeatedly telephoned, emailed, and met with Sandy City’s attorney, David
Wright, regarding strategy (R3562, R3564, R3566, R3569, R3570, R3595), and
participated in expert report and deposition matters (R3561-3562), motion preparation
(3562, R3564, R3568, R3569), and assisted with affidavit (R3569), evidence for defense
of slander of title (R3572), and appeal, appellate argument, and appellate briefs. (R3570,
R3574, R3578, R3584, R3592) Haik also proffered Sandy City’s answers attesting to his
role (R4028) as well as deposition testimony concerning it. (R4049-4050; R4053-4054)
Sandy City’s attorney actually invoked an attorney-client privilege pertaining to the
communications between Sandy City and Draney:
18
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MR. WRIGHT: Ron, just so you know, Bryce and I discussed this. We
knew these questions would come up, conversations between Shawn and
Bryce. And Shawn at the time was representing the City and still does on a
couple of things. And we're willing to waive the attorney-client privilege
with respect to these particular communications, but as to no others.
(R4050, ll. 13-20) Dismissal was denied. (R2963-2966)
City’s Canyon Water and Approval to Supply Albion Basin Subdivision
The City alleges owning “a majority of the rights to the use of LCC” (R2003, ¶7,
¶27) and being “the largest retail water provider in the State”. (R1773); having over the
course of more than a century, “acquired the majority of the water rights of Little
Cottonwood Creek to serve public needs.” (R1780) The City asserts “SLC water rights
provide for nearly all the in-canyon usage of water”. (R1774) The City explains:
On a flow basis, Plaintiffs and Sandy City collectively own the rights to use
99.65% of the first 94.79 cfs of LCC (the “first and second primary”
rights), 99.55% of the flow rights up to 111.86 cfs (the combined “first and
second primary” and “first surplus” rights), approximately 88% of the flow
rights up to 159.09 cfs (the combined “first and second primary” and “first
surplus” and “second surplus” rights), and approximately 78% of the flow
rights up to 398.36 cfs (the combined rights including “third surplus”
rights). On a volume basis based on average annual hydrology, Plaintiffs
and Sandy City collectively own the rights to use more than 95% of the first
and second primary rights, and more than 92% of the overall LCC annual
volume.
(R2593)
The City previously appeared in the Utah District Court arguing about its “LCC
water rights” in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case 920900820, that its application
filings in Little Cottonwood Canyon were to cure its default. (R2743-44, ¶103) The City
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was alleged to have “sold water to Alta and Snowbird without filing change applications
as required by law”. (R2742-43, ¶99) The City filed permanent change applications
pertaining to Little Cottonwood Creek water. (R2743, ¶100) These Little Cottonwood
Creek applications were seven of 34 applications filed by the City, in part, seeking to
remedy its alleged default and avoid defeasance as pled in Cahoon and Maxfield v. Salt
Lake City, Utah Third District Court, Civil No. 920900820. (R2742, ¶96) The State
Engineer’s segregation history identifies the City’s applications in Little Cottonwood
Creek as numbered 57-10009 through 57-10015; and appropriate approximately 2,686.0
ac-ft. (R2422) Plan and profile mappings are provided. (ADD40 and ADD41)
The memoranda decisions of the State Engineer approving the City’s applications
noted five of the City’s applications stated historic uses were municipal but that the
underlying water rights held by the irrigation companies and utilized by exchange
agreement were for irrigation such that the City’s application actually converted the
nature of use from irrigation to municipal use. (R1415, R1448, R1506, R1661, R1699)
The State Engineer approved year-round municipal use for domestic requirements and
incidental uses of Alta Peruvian Lodge, and for 13 homes (R1414-1416); use by the
United States Forest Service in Little Cottonwood Canyon for recreational and incidental
purposes (R1447-1448); domestic requirements for a duplex (R1505-1507); resort use at
Snowbird including snow making (R1545-1547); municipal purposes in the Town of Alta
and snow making (R1579-1581); for John D. Cahill’s home (R1660-1663); and 15.75 ac20
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ft for year-round municipal use for “domestic requirement for 35 homes in the Albion
Basin Subdivision” (ADD35-ADD37; ADD42). Court appointed commissioner Higbee
testified the City’s applications for 2,500.0 ac-ft per year would not impair rights of the
ditch companies or other users. (R1603)
The City submitted a map of the Salt Lake City Service Area and separately
designated areas within and without its corporate boundaries.

(ADD29)

The City

mapped Albion Basin Subdivision as within the City’s service area outside its corporate
boundaries. (ADD29; ADD40; ADD42; R2736, ¶64) Utah Laws 1973 Chapter 190,
entitled “Notice Concerning Proof of Appropriation”, approved by the Utah Legislature
on March 2, 1973, related to the manner in which notice of proof of change was to be
given. (R2736, ¶60) As part of an application a municipal applicant was to file proof by
a description by configuration on a map of the place of use of water and a statement of
the purpose, and method of use. This obligation was codified in Utah Code § 73-3-16
(R2736, ¶61) and explained in official publication entitled “The Utah Water Rights
Adjudication”. (R2736, ¶¶63; R2793)
The week before submitting its exchange applications, the City wrote: “Once the
City has the contracts we will not certify for water service for new building permits.”
(R2746, ¶113; ADD30-ADD34) Just after hearing on the Snowbird and Alta applications,
the City wrote: “Salt Lake City promised Mayor Levitt that it would gain control of the
Albion Basin contracts in order to protect the area from development by using Salt Lake
21
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City’s watershed management muscle to deny them water.” (R2747, ¶119; ADD38ADD39)
The State Engineer approved the City’s applications to supply Salt Lake County
Service Area No. 3 – Snowbird (2000.0 ac-ft) and the Town of Alta (500.0 ac-ft).
(R1547, R1581) Shortly after, while the City’s application to supply Albion Basin
Subdivision was pending; Haik purchased his lots. (R1795)
First Federal District Court Action (Haik I)
Shortly after the Snowbird and Alta approvals, Haik inquired about water supply
but the City declined consent to Alta extending water supply, relying on Paragraph 8 of a
1976 Water Supply Agreement between the City and the Town of Alta and the 1991
Watershed Ordinance, § 17.04.020 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances. (R1795)
Haik filed suit asserting five claims: (1) inverse condemnation against Alta under
Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution (R0356-57); (2) relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983 against Alta for denial of equal protection (R3057-59); (3) relief pursuant to
Article I, sections 7 and 24, of the Utah Constitution against Alta for deprivation of
substantive due process and equal protection (R3059); (4) declaratory relief as to the
Water Supply Agreement between Alta and the City (R3060); and (5) injunctive relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other applicable laws barring the Water Supply
Agreement as a defense and requiring Alta to make available municipal services upon
payment of connection fees and costs (R3060-62): The complaint asserted no due process
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claims under either the Federal or the State constitutions. (R3046-66) Utah Constitution
Article I, § 22, provides “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.”
Haik moved for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R1789) While this
motion was pending, the State Engineer approved the City’s other applications including
approval for municipal supply to 35 homes in the Albion Basin Subdivision. (R1416,
R1449, R1507, R1662, R1700) Pursuant to Utah Code § 73-3-10, the City was authorized
to proceed with the construction of the necessary works; take any steps required to apply
the water to the use named in the application; and perfect the proposed use of 15.75 acre
feet annually for supplying the homes. (R2734, ¶47; ADD35-ADD37) More than 400
gallons per day was available for each home in Albion Basin Subdivision; exceeding
culinary water requirements. (R2734, ¶49)
Just after State Engineer’s approval; Alta and the City opposed Haik’s motion
(Dkt. nos. 19, 22), and filed cross motions for summary judgment (Dkt. nos. 18, 21),
accompanied by supporting affidavits (Dkt. nos. 20, 23, 24). (R1789-90) The affidavits
did not disclose the State Engineer’s approval. Id. Haik responded and Alta and the City
replied with a supplemental affidavit. (Dkt. nos. 31, 32, 33, 34, 36), together with a
supplemental affidavit (Dkt. no. 35). (R1790)
At hearing (R1790); Judge Jenkins asked:
THE COURT: Looking at Albion, the dry cabin area up there, it is your
position that Salt Lake City would never, as the result of the water
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management plan, ever be in a position to authorize the extension of
water or sewer into that area?
MR. BRAMHALL: I’m reluctant to fall into the trap never or ever, Your
Honor. I think we could say, at some point in time, maybe the Forest
Service says: We are not going to allow any recreational purposes up
there. We are going to close the canyon down. And all of a sudden,
any degradation of water that relates to that comes off the scale, and
we find new water shed management techniques that maybe get into
place, as we do every decade, new water shed management
techniques. So, to say never, I think would be difficult. To say, under
our current understanding of the system, I think it would be very
difficult for us to ever consider that.
(R2751, ¶148) Bramhall appeared on behalf of the City during the State Engineer’s
hearing on the City’s applications including that for supplying Albion Basin Subdivision.
(R2751, ¶149; R1690) Bramhall withheld approval to supply Albion Basin Subdivision
and its mapping within the Salt Lake City Service Area. (R2751, ¶150; (R6136; R6079)
Judge Jenkins requested additional City data concerning water availability.
(R1790). The City submitted. (R2752, ¶152; R1171-83) The City admits it “did not list
SLC’s many approved change applications”. (Case 2:12-cv-00997-PMW Document 27
Filed 11/16/12 Page 24 of 53)(R2752, ¶153; R1171-83) The City did not disclose unmetered water sales to Lots 9, 13, and 21. (R2752, ¶154; R922-50 (Lot 9); R951-88 (Lot
13); R989-1011 (Lot 21)) GRAMA response by the City discloses these un-metered
water sales are pursuant to the water right approved for Albion Basin Subdivision.
(R2752, ¶157; R1184-96)
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Unaware, Judge Jenkins ruled referencing Article XI, § 6. (R1805, n. 13; R1806,
n. 14) Judge Jenkins wrote: “If a duty to supply water exists, that duty must devolve
upon the entity with legal right to, and lawful control of the water that may be physically
available to the Haiks’ property – Salt Lake City.” (R1805) Judge Jenkins further wrote:
“The general duty imposed upon municipalities by Article XI, §6 of the Utah
Constitution, viz., that ‘all such waterworks, water rights, and sources of water supply
now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved,
maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges,’ presupposes that the water to be supplied to inhabitants has already been
lawfully acquired by the municipality.” (R1806, p. 18, n. 13)
The City admits: “Judge Jenkins did not directly address the claim that Art. XI, §
6, of the Utah Constitution requires the City to provide water”. (App. Case 13-4050 Doc
01019097685, p. 26) As to equal protection pertaining to the City, Judge Jenkins wrote
only:
As noted above, however, Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish water
to users outside its own city limits, be they ‘similarly situated’ or not. As
an owner of water rights, Salt Lake City’s role in this instance is proprietary
rather than administrative. The equal protection yardstick is simply not
available to measure Salt Lake City’s exercise of its contractual powers to
consent pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Water Supply Agreement.
(R1809-10) Judge Jenkins opined Haik lacked “‘one 'strand’ of the bundle’.” (R1812)
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Little Cottonwood Creek Distribution System Established
The month after the City’s submission; the State Engineer issued notice to
establish a distribution system organization for Little Cottonwood Creek.

(R2427)

Appointed commissioners are to obtain flow data, determine deliveries to each diversion;
coordinate closely with municipalities (especially Salt Lake City); and annually report.
(R2428-29) The City is part of the municipal group and “responsible for selecting its
representative to the committee”. (R2430-34) The established distribution system is
mapped and its flows diagramed including the diversion for Biddulph’s water right,
WRN 57-7800; now owned by Haik. (ADD29; ADD18; ADD19) The branch lines used
for WRN 57-7800 are mapped. (ADD20; ADD21)
First Tenth Circuit Opinion (Haik I)
After the State Engineer approved Albion Basin Subdivision water supply, the
Tenth Circuit issued its first opinion. The opinion notes the dissimilarity between the
language of Article I, § 24, and its federal counterpart (R3238-43; R3241) and that “It is
unclear whether the district court considered their equal protection claim under both state
and federal law or solely under state law.” (R3242, n. 3) After noting dissimilarity
there’s only brief comment: “Alta consistently refused to extend its water lines outside its
1976 city limits without Salt Lake City’s permission. Thus, Alta treats all persons in the
class of property owners outside its 1976 city limits, including the Haiks, the same.
Furthermore, Alta’s and Salt Lake City’s actions were reasonable.” (R3241) Neither
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Article XI, § 6; the State Engineer’s approval; nor supply to other homes are considered.
(R3239-42) The City admits Water Right 57-10015 “application a16846 allows the City
to use more than the amount of water described in the 1963 Agreement in Albion Basin”.
(R2765, ¶54)
Instead the Tenth Circuit Court opined there was no taking under Article I, § 22.
(R3241-42) The opinion expressed: “The Haiks cannot maintain a taking claim because
they did not have a protectable interest in property that was taken or damaged by Alta’s
denial of a building permit.” (R3242) Without reference to Article XI, § 6, the Tenth
Circuit opined: “Furthermore, mere expectation of municipal water service in the future
is not a legal right that constitutes property subject to taking. See Bagford, 904 P.2d at
1099 (expectation of renewal of lease not property subject to taking).” (R3242) Bagford
v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1096 (Utah 1995) pertained to whether a municipal
garbage collection ordinance resulted in a taking of a private garbage collection business.
The City Extends Approval to Supply Albion Basin Subdivision
About one year after the Tenth Circuit opinion, the City applied to extend the State
Engineer’s approval for the City to supply Albion Basin Subdivision. (R1157) The City
attested “Salt Lake City is currently working with the Canyonlands to have a water meter
installed as part of the City’s Canyon meter installation project.” (R1157) The City
attested it was “holding this right to meet future requirements of the public, which under
Section 73-3-12(2)(j) Utah Code Annotated constitutes reasonable and due diligence”.
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(R1199) As of that attestation, Canyonlands had been dissolved for more than 27 years.
(R1200-01) The City admits it has no record of compliance with the referenced metering
requirements. (R1205)
Haik Purchases Missing “Strand”
After the State Engineer approved the City extending its right to serve Albion
Basin Subdivision; Biddulph conveyed her water right title quieted to Haik. Haik v.
Sandy City, 254 P.3d 171, 174 (Utah 2011). Before Biddulph conveyed, the City wrote
to her:
We appreciated the time that you have taken to resolve the South Despain
Water Users issue regarding Salt Lake City supplying water to the South
Despain users under the agreement with the Despain’s dated January 3,
1913. It is Salt Lake City’s intent to comply with the agreement.
Salt Lake City has installed a meter on the 6-inch pipeline which is
connected to the Murray City penstock pipe. To be in compliance with the
1913 agreement, please be advised that during the summer months Salt
Lake City intends to throttle the valve to the 6-inch meter in a manner
which will only allow the South Despain users to receive .25 cfs. The
distribution of water to the users beyond the 6-inch meter is the
responsibility of the South Despain water right owners. … During the
winter months, the meter will be restricted to provide the users a maximum
of 7500 gallons per day as stipulated in the contract.
(R3797) The City also disclosed: “The 6 inch meter on the 6 inch pipe was sized for the
summer flow of 0.25 cfs and does not record the low flows of 0.0116 cfs during the
winter months.” (R2472-2473) And, the City further disclosed “Also, the meter is
buried under snow much of the winter months and cannot be read.” (R2473)
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The City had previously prepared a report explaining this connection to the
Murray City penstock pipe and its advantages to the City. (R2346-49; R2096-2100) The
branch service lines and tap outlets are mapped and remain in operation. (ADD20 and
ADD21) These branch service lines and tap outlets are not connected with Sandy City
water distribution. (R6108) The branch service lines and tap outlets properties lie within
the Little Cottonwood Subdivision. (R6081)
Biddulph filed to extend approval of her right. (R2492) The City knew the
information was “for filing your proof due for water right 57-7800 (a24463) with the
Utah State Engineer”. (R2473) Biddulph’s extension was approved. (R2493-2494) After
that approval, Haik obtained his “missing strand” based upon Haik v. Sandy City and
applied for use in Albion Basin Subdivision. Id.
City Opposes Use of the “Missing Strand”
The City protested asserting it “holds more rights to beneficially use the water of
Little Cottonwood Creek and its tributaries than any other entity or individual”. (R1076)
The City claimed its “water rights in Little Cottonwood Creek include … 57-10009
through 57-10015”. (R1076-77; see also 1086-87) Sandy City then recorded its deed
leading to the quieting of title in Haik v. Sandy City in May 2011.
Within two weeks, the City sent its letter to Salt Lake Valley Health Department
and the Town of Alta. (R2737-2738, ¶¶69-76; R2765, ¶56; R1214) On one hand the
City asserts “amount of water allowed under the contract cannot exceed 50 gallons per
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day per connection” (R1214); and on the other asserts: “The only thing that has changed
since 1997 is that the 1963 Agreement has been abandoned.” (R2765, ¶53) Years
earlier, in May 2008; the City filed an affidavit attesting to abandonment. (R2765-66,
¶¶59-61; R1215-18) The City admits approved “application a16846 allows the City to
use more than the amount of water described in the 1963 Agreement in Albion Basin”
and the City asserts it is supplying water to the homes in the same subdivision pursuant to
that water right. (R2765, ¶54; R2764, ¶50; R1184-1198)
The City’s letter prompted permit denial. (R2005, ¶35; R2726, ¶14)2 SLVHD
asserts “…failure to attach the required documentation of a letter from the City indicating
his access to water, the sole basis for the summary judgment decision of the Health
Department’s hearing Officer” led to denial of approval of sewerage for homes in the
Albion Basin Subdivision. (Appellate Case 14-4074 Doc. 01019325972 pp. 36-37)”.
(R2766, ¶64)

Before the City’s letter, water certification letters issued for other

landowners in the City’s service area outside its corporate boundaries. (R2810-74) The
City filed reports showing deliveries to Haik’s formerly Biddulph’s right. (R2474-82)
The City entered into new water supply permit and agreements. (R2767, ¶67; R2875-80;
R2881-86; R2887-92) The City obtained approval for other domestic water users

2

The Salt Lake County Service Area #3 determined Haik’s “plans would
implement an acceptable engineered and/or construction control and land management
strategy for these lots.” (R2913; R2912-2914; R2772, ¶94) The Town Building Official
issued notice of intent to issue the building permit for this residence once Salt Lake
Valley Health Department issues were addressed. (R2800-2808; R2766-2767, ¶65)
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inhabiting the City’s service area outside the corporate boundaries to comply with current
conditions. (2767-68, ¶¶68-69; R2893-2911) The City gave approval to water supply and
permit agreements to supply construction of new single-family dwellings and demolition
and reconstruction of single-family dwellings outside the municipal corporate boundaries.
(R2768, ¶¶70-71)
Second Federal District Court Action (Haik II)
Haik filed a complaint in Haik v. Salt Lake City (2012) Case No. 2:12-cv-00997TS (R3068-3182; particularly R3181-82) Seven counts are alleged: Count I sought to set
aside the prior judgment for after-discovered fraud upon the court. (R3155-57). Count II
sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for denial of equal protection by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by the City. (R3158-64) Count III sought
relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for denial of equal protection in a personal capacity by
Niermeyer, who signed the City’s May 2011 letter. (R3164-69) Count IV sought relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for denial of substantive due process by the City. (R316971) Count V sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for denial of procedural due
process by the City. (R3171-74) Count VI sought relief for misrepresentation. (R317579) Count VII sought relief for civil conspiracy between the City and Alta. (R3179-81)
Within the complaint there are only 14 paragraphs citing to the Utah Constitution.
(R3079, ¶62; R3082, ¶78; 3135, ¶363; R3137, ¶373; R3143, ¶407; R3144, ¶417; R3151,
¶459; R3158, ¶¶494, 496, and 497; R3159, ¶500; R3166, ¶543; and R3172, ¶574) Those
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allegations pertain to showing falsity of statements, distinguishing issues not litigated;
change in material operative facts; clearly established law pertinent to immunity; and
legal claim of entitlement arising under State law. (Case 2:12-cv-00997-TS, Doc. 38, pp.
9, 11, 16; Doc. 39, pp. 9-11, 18; Doc. 40, pp. 7, 10, 13, 21, 23-24, 27, 57) (Case 2:12cv-00997-TS, Doc. 38, pp. 9, 11, 16, 24-25, 46, 61-62; Doc. 39, pp. 9-11, 18, 46, 48-49,
50-51; Doc. 40, pp. 7, 10, 13, 21, 23-24, 27, 46, 52, 55, 57-59)
Without hearing, the Federal District Court dismissed the action. (R3203) Only
brief discussion is given of Article XI, § 6. (R3202). As to res judicata, the District Court
decision is similarly brief. (R3200) No consideration is expressed as to the City’s the
1963 Agreement was abandoned or the State Engineer’s approval of water supply
allowing use of more water than prescribed by the 1963 Agreement. (R3199-3203)
Second Tenth Circuit Opinion (Haik II)
The Tenth Circuit Court recognized the City did not argue issue preclusion applied
as to due process claims. (R3187) The Tenth Circuit acknowledged due process claims
were not raised against the City in the case before Judge Jenkins in Haik I. (R3188) In
reviewing Federal Due Process claims, the Tenth Circuit sua sponte gave preclusive
effect relying upon Article I, § 22. (R3187-89) The Tenth Circuit saw denial of a
building permit and denial of water supply as a difference without a distinction. (R3188)
The Tenth Circuit opined as to municipal appropriation that “Nothing about this process
requires the successful applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner approved.”
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(R3188-3189) This reasoning does not square with prior precedence of this Court that
valid appropriation requires: (1) intent to apply the water to beneficial use; (2) a diversion
from the natural channel by means of a ditch, canal, or other structure; and (3) an
application of it within a reasonable time to useful industry. Sowards v. Meagher, 37
Utah 212 (1910).” (R2759-60, ¶19)
The Tenth Circuit rejected contention Article XI, § 6, applied determining, even
assuming the lots were within the City’s service area; people “beyond the limits of the
city” were not protected inhabitants. (R3188) Yet, this Court when interpreting Article
XI, § 6, previously rejected a narrow or strict reading, Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80
P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1938). (R2762, ¶37) A “reasonableness requirement” articulated in
County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954), and Platt v. Town of
Torrey was also rejected as applying “only after a municipality elected to supply water to
nonresidents”. (R3189) The Tenth Circuit rejected any preclusive effect as to equal
protection because “new allegations are enough to make the Haiks’ equal-protection …
claims different for purposes of claim preclusion”. (R3187; R3190)
Having Been Sued Haik Counterclaimed
The City sued Haik alleging his claim to water “will interfere with the Plaintiffs’
respective rights to divert, treat and provide LCC water to the members of the public
served by Plaintiffs”. (R2017, ¶119) Having been sued and denied dismissal, Haik
counterclaimed. (R2963-65; R724-83) The Counterclaims ask the District Court declare
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the rights of the parties as to five aspects of the City’s water rights allegedly injured.
(R2782)
First Counterclaim: Proper Interpretation of Article XI, § 6
The first legal question presented was whether Utah Constitution Article XI, § 6,
is properly interpreted to give property owners a constitutionally protected right to water
when a change application is approved designating their subdivision as a permissible
place of use of water. (R2757-58, ¶9) The City asserts it holds and exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction pursuant to Article XI, § 6, and Utah Code § 10-8-15. (R2762, ¶32)
Haik contends the phrase “shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for
supplying its inhabitants with water” imposes a requirement that water be supplied given
the State Engineer’s approval. (R2758, ¶13) They contend exercise of jurisdiction should
encompass duty to serve within that jurisdiction. (R2763, ¶44) The City exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ properties by expressly defining the
Salt Lake City Watershed Area as including “all of the watershed area east of the Little
Cottonwood Canyon Road and North Fork of Little Cottonwood Road”. (Salt Lake City
Code §17.04.010) (R2769, ¶78)
The City has contended that construing “the constitution in that manner would be
a significant perversion of the constitutional language and indeed the entire legal and
administrative process governing the ownership and use of water”. (R2758, ¶15) The
City has also contended that, even if a duty to supply were recognized, non-residents of
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Salt Lake City would not fall within the parameters of the constitutional duty because the
constitutional claim “depends on the location of the property”. (R2760, ¶20)
Second Counterclaim: Article I, § 24 Mandates
The second legal question presented is whether Article I, § 24, mandates water
supply through revocable contracts, as evidenced by the water sales records, approval
letters, and water permit and supply agreements provided to others including homes in
the same subdivision; in order to uniformly provide to inhabitants who reside within the
City’s municipal service area though outside the municipal corporate boundaries.
(R2769, ¶76) Haik contends the different treatment given he as opposed to other
inhabitants within the City’s municipal service area, though residing outside the
municipal corporate boundaries, in receiving approvals or supply are not based upon
differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of Article XI, § 6
and are so discriminatory as to violate uniformity required by Article I, § 24. (R2769,
¶77)
Haik stands ready, willing and able to finance the costs of extension and to accept
water at the prescribed payment rates as afforded other inhabitants without the City’s
municipal service area though outside the municipal corporate boundaries. (R2769, ¶80)
He contends a remedy should lie because, given ready responsibility and willingness to
bear the burdens of extension, the City’s duty is “a ministerial act about which it would
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have no discretion” as opined in Rose v. Plymouth Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285,
286 (Utah 1946). (R2769-70, ¶81)
Third Counterclaim: Article I, § 7 and LUDMA
The third legal question presented was whether promising to deny water “as a
means of controlling development in the Albion Basin” violates rights afforded under the
provisions of the Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act, Utah Code
§§ 10-9a-101 et seq.; thereby denying due process of law protected by Article I, §7, of
the Utah Constitution. (R2771, ¶87) Utah Code §10-8-15 does not confer authority upon
Salt Lake City to “control development”; that power is conferred by Utah Code 10-9a102(2) and does not extend to Salt Lake City controlling development in Albion Basin,
particularly Albion Basin Subdivision. (R2771, ¶88)
Salt Lake City can only “exercise its legislative powers through ordinances.” Utah
Code § 10-3-701. (R2773, ¶95) The expressed intent of denying new water certifications
evidenced in the City’s memoranda do not disclose passage or enactment by the
governing body of the City; are not in the mandated form of an ordinance, Utah Code §§
10-3-704-05; and do not include disclosure of publication or posting, Utah Code § 10-3711. (R2773, ¶96) “Failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the
ordinance renders it invalid.” Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986).
(R2773, ¶97) Promising to deny water violates “the requirement of reasonableness,
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which attends all actions by municipalities” and which does “not cease at the city limits.”
Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 P.2d 325, 330 (Utah 1997). (R2773, ¶98)
Fourth Counterclaim: Validity of Denying Stated Beneficial Use
The fourth legal question seeks declaration determining the validity of
appropriation by the City in Water Right 57-10015 (a16846) or Water Right 57-10013
(a16844) due to an expressed intent and promise not (1) to apply the appropriated water
to the stated beneficial use; and (2) refusal and failure to supply appropriated water
within a reasonable time to the stated beneficial use. (R2781, ¶129) This question
includes declaration determining the continued validity of appropriation by the City as
expressed in Water Right 57-10015 (a16846) or Water Right 57-10013 (a16844) due to
failure to apply the appropriated water to the stated beneficial use. (R2781, ¶130)
Fifth Counterclaim: Effect of State Policy of Displacing Competition
The fifth legal question seeks declaration determining whether the “state policy of
displacing competition with regulation in the area of municipal control over water and
water rights” articulated in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33,
has now led to the City rendering a utility service outside its city limits to such an extent
as to be “subject to some public regulation” as recognized in Salt Lake County v. Salt
Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1977), and if so, the extent of the regulation and
rights, status, and other legal relations of Counterclaim Plaintiffs as to the City arising
from or relating to that regulation. (R2781, ¶132)
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Preclusion Applied To Counterclaims
The District Court, Judge Stone, applied claim preclusion stating:
Salt Lake City’s (SLC) Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety as
to Defendant Haik, and the ` Haik's Counterclaims are DISMISSED. As to
Mr. Haik, the Counterclaims are barred by res judicata. While Utah courts
are not bound by prior federal court interpretations of the Utah
Constitution, parties to those prior federal court cases are. During
argument, counsel for Mr. Haik and the Butler Management Group
conceded that the claims and issues asserted in the first, second, and third
Counterclaims were presented in one or both of the prior federal cases—
Haik v. Town of Alta (1996) and Haik v. Salt Lake City (2012). And, while
the fourth and fifth Counterclaims were not asserted in those cases, they
could have been. As such, they are barred by claim preclusion. Macris &
Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 19, 16 P.3d 1214 (“Claim
preclusion involves the same parties or their privies and also the same cause
of action, and . . . precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have
been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior
action.”).
(R4300) A brief exchange occurred as to the prior actions:
MR. HAIK: Which allegations?
THE COURT: The disparate treatment and these permits being granted to
other people in the plat.
MR. HAIK: No. The -- for Judge Jenkins, Judge Jenkins was back in -- that
lawsuit was basically about 1994 to 1996. Some of these –
THE COURT: Hadn't happened at that point.
MR. HAIK: -- hadn't happened yet, so he couldn't deal with that. The third
counterclaim –
THE COURT: And the Stewart?
MR. HAIK: They were raised in the Stewart matter. And I understand the
underlying principle is they’re saying, well, you don’t have a federal
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constitutional right pertaining to those. But that’s where the Jensen
decision to which I referenced you, and it’s cited in the brief, where
the Utah Supreme Court explains the fact that the same facts are
material both weighs under the federal constitutional claim and the
state constitutional claim.
THE COURT: I understood that –
MR. HAIK: Okay.
THE COURT: -- but I gotta tell you, I have a little problem with the notion
that federal courts can’t also decide state constitutional questions if
they have jurisdiction over the whole.
MR. HAIK: Oh, and I understand that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And so I guess the question I -- is, was this disparate
treatment under the state constitution raised in Stewart 1?
MR. HAIK: We did -- in the first Stewart, yes, there were equal protection,
disparate treatment. And these were the same facts that were at issue.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HAIK: Okay.
(R4227, p. 18, ll. 6-25; R4228, ll. 1-20)
Third Tenth Circuit Opinion Reversing and Remanding State Law Issues
Judge Stone did not address the most recent opinion of the Tenth Circuit reversing
dismissal based upon preclusion by Judge Stewart of the appeal of the denial by Salt
Lake County Board of Health (“SLVHD”); Case 2:13-cv-01051-TS in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah. (Case 2:13-cv-01051-TS Doc 25)
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SLVHD had removed the case and moved dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing claims were barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion
because of the same actions preceding this dispute. (App. Case 14-4074 Doc.
01019397152 pp. 1-2) Haik moved to remand to state court, claiming his complaint
raised issues primarily of state law, but the district court denied his motion and
summarily dismissed the case. (App. Case 14-4074 Doc. 01019397152 pp. 2) The Tenth
Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the State law questions to the State Court.
(App. Case 14-4074 Doc. 01019397152 pp. 8)
ARGUMENT
Essential Elements of Claim Preclusion Are Missing
None of the alleged counterclaims are barred by claim preclusion. The second or
third of the three essential elements is missing as to each counterclaim. “All three
elements must be established for claim preclusion to apply.” Miller v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co.,
2002 UT 6, ¶ 58. Those latter elements being:
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in
the first suit or be one that could and should have been raised in the first
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ¶ 34..
Change of Circumstance and Counterclaims Inappropriate to Prior Actions
The alleged counterclaims arise under the Utah Constitution, particularly Article I,
§ 7 and Article I, § 24, and Article XI, § 6; and prior decisions of this Court. Haik v. Salt
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Lake City (2012) did not allege any claims for relief under the Utah Constitution. In this
action the State law counterclaims are pled solely for declaratory relief in response to
claim of injury and suit by the City. The City having never before asserted injury to its
alleged water rights, there was no occasion for counterclaims challenging aspects and
validity of the City’s water rights.
By alleging claim of injury to the City’s water rights, a new event occurred giving
rise to the State law counterclaims and facts which differ “in time, space, origin, or
motivation”. Gillmor v. Fam. Link, LLC, 2012 UT 38, ¶ 13, 284 P.3d 622, 627. As to
Haik v. Town of Alta (1996), this point is especially compelling in that the City “did not
list SLC’s many approved change applications” (Case 2:12-cv-00997-PMW Document
27 Filed 11/16/12 Page 24 of 53) (R2752, ¶153) and did not disclose its un-metered water
sales being made to Lots 9, 13, and 21 of Albion Basin Subdivision (the subdivision in
which the Haik lots are located). (R2752, ¶154) Haik v. Town of Alta (1996) was
decided long before many of the acts underlying the current counterclaims occurred such
as issuance of water approval letters, application to allow current compliance, continued
issuance of water supply agreements. The City admits: “Judge Jenkins did not directly
address the claim that Art. XI, § 6, of the Utah Constitution requires the City to provide
water”. (App. Case 13-4050 Doc 01019097685, p. 26)
By suing for alleged injury to the City’s water rights, the City presented a change
of circumstances that takes the counterclaims out of any preclusion:
41
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Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with
respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in
conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be
made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first. See
Illustrations 10-12. Where important human values -- such as the
lawfulness of a continuing personal disability or restraint -- are at stake,
even a slight change of circumstances may afford a sufficient basis for
concluding that a second action may be brought.
Restat 2d of Judgments, § 24 cmt. f (2nd ed. 1982). Continuing State constitutional
guarantees and the duties of municipalities and rights of Utah citizens pertaining to
municipal water supply afford “a sufficient basis for concluding that a second action may
be brought”. Id.
Pragmatically, as to Haik v. Salt Lake City (2012), the counterclaims for
declaratory relief present distinctly different questions than claims seeking relief pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of Federal Constitutional protections. The question of
whether the state policy of displacing private water rights which flows from Article XI, §
6, has led to such extensive water supply outside the City’s corporate boundaries (now
the largest water retailer in Utah) so as to exceed the exemption from regulation
previously recognized does not form a single convenient unit with relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Question as to the invalidity of municipal appropriation based upon intent
to deny and denial of the stated beneficial use contrary Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah
212, 108 P. 1112, 1116 (1910) and In re Bear River, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991) again
plainly differ from relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
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Question as to when the

“reasonableness requirement” attaches to municipal actions similarly is not in any
manner an aspect of relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Only Utah Supreme Court Finally Interprets State Constitution
This Court steadfastly declares its “authority and obligation to interpret Utah’s
constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we owe federal law no
more deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical state
language.” State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49; Gray v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 681 P.2d 807
(Utah 1984). Haik contends Federal courts cannot foreclose Utah State Court review of
Federal interpretations of Article XI, § 6; and Article I, § 7 and Article I, § 24, of the
Utah Constitution as applied to the City’s new claims of injury never before pled.
Because this Court reserves final interpretation, particularly given the uniqueness of
Article XI, § 6, and dissimilarity between Utah Constitution Article I, § 24, and the
Federal Constitution; the Utah Courts are available to finally declare State constitutional
provisions.
Compelling Need to Finally Interpret State Constitutional Guarantees
Utah law must guide future conduct that is at issue. In this case, there is reason for
interpreting unique State constitutional provision at the heart of this dispute. The Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning introduced clear conflict with prior precedence of this Court and
confusion as to the scope and the effect of State constitutional guarantees. The Tenth
Circuit began by interpreting denial of a building permit and as denial of water asserting
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it was “difference without distinction”. This perception runs wholly counter to State
constitutional debate of a unique provision.
During debate on amending Article XI, § 6, Mr. Goodwin remarked: “Everyone
has his pro rata right to the water, and all charges are for another purpose altogether; that
is, when it is carried to a man’s house, they charge him for it, and those three words in the
article are simply surplusage.”

1 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional

Convention for the State of Utah, 670-71 (1898). Mr. Van Horne similarly remarked
“[Section 6] is simply a general declaration that the municipality shall reserve its control
over water rights for the supply of its inhabitants.” Id. at 671. Samuel R. Thurman
further remarked:
Now I take the position that if we leave the balance of the section stand,
requiring cities to hold this property as a trust for the benefit of the
inhabitants to supply them with water, the courts will always construe the
question of a reasonable charge, because it will be a trust fixed and form by
the Constitution for the purpose of supplying the people with water, and
they will have no right to charge more than a reasonable amount.
Id. at 672. There is a profound recognition of the vital importance of water in Utah.Delta
Canal Co. v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC, 2013 UT 69. Water is not akin to all
other property.
The Tenth Circuit sua sponte equated claim of entitlement germane to a taking
under Article I, § 22, with question whether municipal water services are an “entitlement
constituting property under the purview of due process protection of the Constitution of
Utah, Article I, Section 7”. Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 340 (Utah 1980).
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Given the uniqueness of Article XI, §, and the usufructuary character of water this
equivalence cannot be said to exist such that independent analysis is necessary.
Extending preclusive effect from Article I, § 22, to Article XI, § 6, or Article I, § 7,
without independent analysis is inappropriate.
By approaching the question by extension from Article I, § 22, the Tenth Circuit
did not consider the language of Article XI, § 6. Instead, focus was upon appropriative
law without reference to seminal cases.

Those seminal cases are clear: “the three

principal elements to constitute a valid appropriation of water” are: “(1) intent to apply it
to some beneficial use; (2) a diversion from the natural channel by means of a ditch,
canal, or other structure; and (3) an application of it within a reasonable time to some
useful industry.”

Sowards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1116 (Utah 1910).

“An

appropriative water right depends on beneficial use for its continued validity.” In re
Bear, 819 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah 1991). Appropriating water imposes a duty to use:
He may not file his application, construct his works, and then hold the water and
wait for something to happen. He cannot withhold the water from the proposed
beneficial use.
Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 225, 108 P. 1112, 1117 (1910). Withholding and
denial from the proposed beneficial use is the foundation of the City’s intent and actions.
Withholding and denial of beneficial use cannot form a legally cognizable basis for the
City’s alleged injury.
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The Tenth Circuit reasoned without reference to this precedence: “Nothing about
this process requires the successful applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner
approved.” (App. Case 13-4040 Doc. 01019259740 p. 14) Utah Constitution Article I, §
26, provides the opposite: “The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”

Utah

Constitution Article XI, § 6, mandates a municipality "shall be preserved, maintained and
operated by it for supplying its inhabitants". The State Constitution and this Court’s
precedence and that Federal reasoning do not square.
The Tenth Circuit skirts this mandate to supply evident in the plain language of
Article XI, § 6, by distinguishing inhabitant of the municipal corporate boundaries from
residents in the municipal service area. Having appropriated to supply and made the
lands at issue part of the established municipal service area, Haik contends that municipal
function is recognized:
It is to be kept in mind that the authority of the city to sell its surplus water
beyond the city limits is derived in the same manner and from the identical
section of the statute which permits it to supply its own inhabitants. Such
sale of surplus water, being authorized by law as a municipal function, is as
much a municipal function as the supplying of water within the city limits,
and disposing of the surplus outside its limits as permitted by statute does
not change its character as a municipality; nor does the ownership and
management of the necessary facilities beyond the city boundaries change
such property to anything other than municipal property.
County. Water Sys. v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 53, 278 P.2d 285, 290 (1954).
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Having appropriated to provide water for homes in the particular subdivision, and
sales of water to some homes in that subdivision; the assertion of what is needed to elect
so as to extend reasonableness arises. Does that extension occur upon appropriation,
upon sales, or upon some other form of election? Whether “election” occurred raises
serious question as to the municipal function at issue as it is clear the municipal function
does not stop at the municipal boundary: Municipalities must act reasonably within and
without their corporate boundaries. Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 P.2d 325, 330 (Utah
1997).
This point is especially compelling in that Salt Lake City characterizes itself as the
largest water retailer in the State, supplying nearly all of the Little Cottonwood Canyon,
and owning or controlling the majority of the water in that canyon; all outside of its
municipal boundaries. It is this extensive control and supply outside the City’s corporate
boundaries which likewise raises the question whether its conduct exceeds the limited
exemption recognized from regulation by the Public Utilities Commission.
Essential Elements of Issue Preclusion Are Missing
District Court Failed to Independently Analyze Constitutional Guarantees
Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, is explicit: “Therefore, the state district
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants solely on the basis of collateral
estoppel was in error.” The reasoning of this Court manifestly applies:
Without an analysis of the independent protections afforded by our state
constitution, the state district court dismissed the Jensens' state law claims
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because a federal court found that the undisputed material facts did not give
rise to a federal constitutional violation. This was error. Because the state
and federal standards for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to
damages for a constitutional violation are different, a federal court
determination that the material undisputed facts do not give rise to a federal
constitutional violation does not preclude a state court from deciding
whether those same facts will give rise to a state constitutional violation.
Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶¶ 45-49, 250 P.3d 465. That same error occurred
here.
This Court charged district courts to independently analyze State Constitutional
provisions. That there are over-lapping facts was clearly conceded and Jensen expressly
noted. Moreover, damages are not sought only declaration of Utah law to guide future
conduct and to rebut new claim of injury.

The fact the second Federal complaint

included reference to State Constitutional provisions does not alter the fact claims were
asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 not State Constitutional claims.
Article XI, § 6, has no comparable Federal constitutional provision or standard.
There is no “default” stance in the Federal Courts as to its meaning.

This Court

indisputably holds the duty and the obligation to interpret Article XI, § 6; particularly as
the Federal interpretation is asserted against the interests of Utah citizens. There is no
error in this notion.
Issues are Different
The fifth counterclaim as to the effect of the State policy of displacement upon
exemption from regulation and the fourth counterclaim legal question seeking declaration
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determining the validity of withheld or denied beneficial use, particularly of Water Right
57-10015 (a16846) or Water Right 57-10013 (a16844) plainly lack identity with Haik v.
Town of Alta (1996) or Haik v. Salt Lake City (2012). No argument is even asserted to
that effect. Similarly, the third counterclaim - whether the City promising to deny water
“as a means of controlling development in the Albion Basin” violates rights afforded
under the provisions of the Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act,
Utah Code §§10-9a-101 et seq.- has no identity with either of the earlier actions. The
second counterclaim also differs as Article I, § 24, was neither pled nor adjudicated in
Haik v. Salt Lake City (2012). Though Article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution was
raised in Haik v. Town of Alta (1996), the issue differed in that it pertained to extension
of the Water Supply Agreement between Alta and the City not disparate treatment arising
from the City’s approved water rights and supply, particularly as the City kept from
Judge Jenkins those approved water rights. There is no basis for issue preclusion as to
these issues.
Lack of Finality
There is no dispute the Tenth Circuit interpreted Article XI, § 6, of the Utah
Constitution. The first counterclaim, however, lacks finality as previously discussed.
The Federal Courts cannot foreclose review by this Court or its lesser State courts when
exercising “authority and obligation to interpret Utah’s constitutional guarantees,
including the scope of due process, and we owe federal law no more deference in that
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regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical state language.”

State v.

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 (2007); Gray v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 681 P.2d 807 (Utah 1984).
In the context of a new claim of injury, there is no finality as to the proper interpretation
of Article XI, § 6, particularly as the issue is presented solely for declaration.
By Stare Decisis Sandy’s Deed Is Void and Cannot Be Basis of Injury
“The doctrine of stare decisis is crucial to our system of justice because it ensures
‘predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication.’” State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d
477, 481 (Utah 2003)(quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). The
import of the doctrine is clear:
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law is decided, that
ruling should be followed by a court of the same or a lower rank in
subsequent cases confronting the same legal issue. Once the court of last
resort makes a legal ruling, decisions on the same issue by courts of a lower
rank are superseded. Stare decisis forges certainty, stability, and
predictability in the law. It also reinforces confidence in judicial integrity
and lays a foundation of order upon which individuals and organizations in
our society can conduct themselves. Thus, stare decisis results in adherence
to a single rule of law throughout a jurisdiction.
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995).
This Court ruled “the Haik Parties were the first to record their deed to the
disputed water right in good faith”. Haik v. Sandy City, 254 P.3d 171, 180 (Utah 2011).
Pursuant to Utah's Recording Act and Utah's Water and Irrigation Act, Sandy City’s deed
is void. Utah Code §§ 57-3-103 and 73-3-12. Yet, the City’s suit alleges:
68.
The Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney, Inc. sold any water
rights they had relating to lands under the South Despain Ditch to Sandy
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City in 1977. Any adjudication in which it was concluded otherwise is not
binding upon Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs were not parties to that proceeding.
(R2011, ¶68)
69.
The Haik v. Sandy City decision does not affect the validity
of the conveyance from the Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy
City. (R2011, ¶69)
70.
One requirement for water rights to pass as an appurtenance
is unity of title. Ownership of the water rights in question and the land in
question must be the same. After the conveyance to Sandy City, no
conveyance of land by Saunders and Sweeney or the Bentleys could carry
by appurtenance any part of the South Despain first primary award.
(R2011, ¶70)
The City’s allegations defy the point of law clearly applying Utah Recording Act and
Utah’s Water and Irrigation Act.

Sandy City’s deed was void whilst Haik’s deed

conveyed the water at issue and its appurtenance.
A void deed could never clothe the City with any interest upon which to quiet title.
“A contract or a deed that is void cannot be ratified or accepted”. Ockey v. Lehmer, 189
P.3d 51, 56 (Utah 2008). The City’s premise is that the State Engineer’s approvals,
though never appealed, likewise lack legal effect. (ADD22-ADD25; ADD27-ADD28)
That premise is wrong. Utah Code § 73-3-14; Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 521
(1948).
Because the City premises its suit upon a void deed and rejects the plain meaning
of the State Engineer’s approvals, the District Court clearly erred in failing to dismiss the
suit. The District Court having though asserted jurisdiction over the City’s claims, the
City necessarily placed at issue the validity and other aspects upon which the City rests
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its allegation of injury. Therefore, Haik is entitled to have the District Court declare the
parties’ rights as to those issues.
CONCLUSION
The largest water retailer is suing a citizen about “death by a thousand cuts”
(R5323, ll. 21-22). The City alleges the proposed lawful use of private water (ADD22ADD25) for a few single family residences (R2014, ¶96) the City contracted to deliver
(ADD13-ADD11) injures public water the City appropriated (ADD35-ADD37) while
intending to and denying the stated beneficial use of supplying those very same homes.
(ADD30-ADD34; ADD38-ADD39). The City “does not record the low flows” (R24722473) yet alleges any lawful use of the private water interferes with approximately
2,686.0 ac-ft. appropriated to supply (R2422) several of Utah's largest ski resorts
including the water appropriated to supply the homes but denied to them. It is the City’s
“muscle” fully applied to “deny” water and “deny” certification. (R2770-71, ¶85;
ADD38-ADD39; R2770, ¶83; ADD30-ADD34)
There is a stark inconsistency in the City’s positions arising solely from the City’s
interpretation of Article XI, § 6.

Haik contends the phrase “shall be preserved,

maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water” imposes a
requirement that water be supplied given the State Engineer’s approval. (R2758, ¶13) The
City contends that construing “the constitution in that manner would be a significant
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perversion of the constitutional language and indeed the entire legal and administrative
process governing the ownership and use of water”. (R2758, ¶15)
The City intends and acts to deny the stated beneficial use of supplying those few
homes. That intent and those acts cannot be reconciled to the objectively analyzed
original plain meaning in historical perspective of the text and structure of Article XI, §
6. The City’s intents and acts violate the “trust fixed and form by the Constitution for the
purpose of supplying the people with water”. 1 Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention for the State of Utah, 672 (1898).
This Court seeks fundamental justice.

If, then, the Federal Courts erred in

interpreting Article XI, § 6, too narrowly or strictly, erred in opining nothing in municipal
appropriation requires intent to use and actual use, erred in recognizing municipal
election triggering a duty to treat nonresidents uniformly as provided by Article I, § 24,
erred in concluding whether municipal sales to some nonresidents established a
municipal utility entitling other nonresidents to water, or erred in not allowing
development of a factual record by adjudication, there is risk of fundamental injustice.
Utah Citizens seeking State Constitutional protections are faced with two actually
divergent and incompatible Federal Court interpretations of the Utah Constitution.
Utah citizens are entitled to seek declaration of Utah law as to public water supply
so that they might know how to conduct their future affairs with a definitive
interpretation of Utah law applicable to those future efforts. They are entitled to know
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